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Abstract. The standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production predicts a 
monotonically declining saving rate, when reasonably calibrated. Ample empirical evidence, 
however, shows that the transition paths of most countries’ saving rates exhibit a statistically 
significant hump-shaped pattern. Prior literature shows that CES production may imply a 
hump-shaped pattern of the saving rate (Goméz, 2008). However, the implied magnitude of 
the hump falls short of what is seen in empirical data. We introduce two non-standard features 
of preferences into a neoclassical growth model with CES production: hyperbolic discounting 
and short planning horizons. We show that, in contrast to the commonly accepted argument, 
in general (except for the special case of logarithmic utility) a model with hyperbolic 
discounting is not observationally equivalent to one with exponential discounting. We also 
show that our framework implies a hump-shaped saving rate dynamics that is consistent with 
empirical evidence. Hyperbolic discounting turns out to be a major factor explaining the 
magnitude of the hump of the saving rate path. Numerical simulations employing a 
generalized class of hyperbolic discount functions, which we term regular discount functions, 
support the results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of hyperbolic discounting on transitional dynamics of the 
saving rate. It is well known that the standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas 
technology, exponential discounting, and isoelastic preferences – a common framework in 
growth theory – exhibits a monotone transition path of the saving rate. For a reasonable 
calibration, it exhibits a monotonically declining transition path as an economy develops 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, p.135 ff.). This property, however, is counterfactual. As is 
discussed in Section 2, ample empirical evidence suggests two regularities: an increase in the 
saving rate as an economy experiences growth of per capita income; and a non-monotone 
transition path, featuring a statistically significant hump.  
 
The problem of the counterfactual prediction of transitional dynamics of the saving rate by the 
standard growth model (with Cobb-Douglas technology) has been addressed in the literature. 
Gómez (2008), among others, provides a solution by introducing a more flexible CES 
production technology. For important situations, the model with CES technology implies a 
humped transition path of the saving rate. This hump is confirmed by a number of numerical 
simulations in the present paper paper. However, the numerical simulations also suggest that 
for reasonable calibrations, the implied hump in the transitional dynamics of the saving rate 
has a significantly smaller amplitude than suggested by the empirical evidence.  
 
In this paper, we modify the model with CES technology in two important respects. First, we 
allow preferences to exhibit hyperbolic discounting (in which case the pure rate of time 
preference declines over time). Empirically, there is abundant evidence for the pure rate of 
time preference to decline over time, i.e., for hyperbolic discounting (cf., e.g., Ainslie 1992, 
and Laibson 1997). Discount rates are time sensitive, exhibiting a “present bias”: people tend 
to put especially high weight on a given gain or loss delayed in the near future as opposed to 
the same gain or loss delayed in the more distant future. Households do not foresee that their 
discount rate declines in delay. This introduces time-inconsistency. Second, households 
exhibit a short planning horizon (as opposed to an infinite planning horizon). Along the lines 
of Caliendo and Aadland (2007), Findley and Caliendo (2009), Caliendo and Findley (2014), 
and Findley and Caliendo (2014), naïve households, who are not aware of their future 
impatience, revise their initial intertemporal consumption plans at every instant in time.  
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Within this framework, we argue that hyperbolic discounting (and short-term planning) – by 
adding a hyperbolic discounting effect to the usual substitution- and income effects – 
magnifies the amplitude of the hump of the transitional path of the saving rate. Numerical 
simulations show that for reasonable calibrations, the implied hump in the transitional 
dynamics of the saving rate has amplitude corresponding to what is suggested by empirical 
evidence.  
 
Specifically, we show the following three results. First, if the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption, θ , differs from unity, our framework is not observationally equivalent with a 
framework with exponential discounting. Intuitively, if  θ ≠ 1, the propensity to consume out 
of wealth is affected by both the discount rate and the rate of interest. As long as the rate of 
interest changes over time, the propensity to consume under hyperbolic discounting develops 
differently from that under exponential discounting. Given the lack of observational 
equivalence, the transitional paths of the saving rate differ between our model and one with 
exponential discounting. Second, as long as per capita income rises over time, the hyperbolic 
discounting effect tends to raise the saving rate relative to a framework with exponential 
discounting, and thereby tends to heighten the saving hump. Intuitively, a declining discount 
rate over time affects the intertemporal substitution effect. At any per capita income level, 
future consumption becomes more attractive as it is less strongly discounted relative to 
exponential discounting. This hyperbolic discounting effect encourages a higher saving rate. 
Third, by presenting numerical simulations, we quantify the impact of hyperbolic discounting 
on the hump of the transitional path of the saving rate. For reasonable calibrations, it is shown 
that the implied hump has an amplitude of around 5 percentage points, which is well in accord 
with empirical evidence. With exponential discounting, in contrast, the amplitude of the hump 
amounts to about one percentage point. In course of the numerical simulations, we introduce 
the class of regular discount functions. This class captures cases in which the second order 
growth rate of the discount rate is a constant multiple of the first-order growth rate. Most 
discounting specifications employed in the prior literature are special cases of the regular 
discount function, notably exponential discounting (where the discount rate is constant), less-
than-exponential discounting, classical hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie 1992), or zero 
discounting. 
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This paper is related to several previous studies on saving rate dynamics. Gómez (2008) and 
Smetters (2003) introduce a CES production technology with elasticities of substitution 
differing from one. They show that a CES between capital and labor below (above) unity 
might imply a hump shaped (inverse-hump shaped) transitional path of the saving rate. Litina 
and Palivos (2010) introduce endogenous technical progress. Both Gómez (2008) and Litina 
and Palivos (2010) identify conditions under which there is overshooting (undershooting) 
behavior of the transition paths of the saving rate. Antràs (2001) shows that the introduction 
of a minimum consumption level (Stone-Geary preferences) may also imply a hump shaped 
savings profile. In his model, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution rises over time, which 
first weakens the substitution effect and later on, the substitution effect dominates the income 
effect, thereby generating a hump shaped transitional path. He also provides econometric 
evidence in support of the humped transitional path of the saving rate both in OECD countries 
and in a larger cross-section of countries.  
 
The following Section 2 provides empirical evidence supporting two observations: as per 
capita income grows, an economy’s saving rate tends to rise, at least over some period; and 
the transitional path of a country’s saving rate behaves non-monotonically over time and 
typically exhibits a hump in the order of about 5 percentage points. Section 3 discusses two 
aspects of hyperbolic discounting. First, it introduces regular discount functions and shows 
that most discount functions found in the literature are special cases of regular discount 
functions. Second, it argues that a sensible comparison of experiments with hyperbolic- 
versus- exponential discount functions requires the same overall level of impatience. Section 
4 presents the model with hyperbolic discounting and short planning horizons. Based on the 
model, the main qualitative results are shown. Section 5, presents numerical simulations 
investigating the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the saving rate hump. The section 
shows that for reasonable calibrations, the saving rate hump amounts to an amplitude of 
roughly 5 percentage points under hyperbolic discounting (in accordance with empirical 
evidence), in contrast to roughly one percentage point under exponential discounting 
(contrary to empirical evidence). Section 6 concludes, and the Appendix contains a number of 
derivations and proofs of propositions.  
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2. The behavior of the saving rate: Empirical evidence  
 
Data on gross national saving rates suggest two regularities: as a country develops, its saving 
rate tends to increase, at least over some range; and, over time, saving rate paths behave non-
monotonically and typically exhibit a hump.  
 
2.1 Rising saving rates along transitional paths 
 
Maddison (1992) provides evidence for 11 countries whose savings account for about half of 
world savings. He finds that over the last hundred-twenty years, the saving rates of all but one 
country (U.S.A.) increased substantially over time. Table 1, which is based on Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004), provides empirical evidence for national saving rates. 
 
Table 1. Gross national saving rates (percent) 
Period Australia Canada France India Japan Korea U.K. U.S.A. 
1870-89 11.2 9.1 12.8 - - - 13.9 19.1 
1890-09 12.2 11.5 14.9 - 12.0 - 13.1 18.4 
1910-29 13.6 16.0 - 6.4 17.1 2.4 9.6 18.9 
1930-49 13.0 15.6 - 7.7 19.8 - 4.8 14.1 
1950-69 24.0 22.3 22.8 12.2 32.1 5.9 17.7 19.6 
1970-89 22.9 22.1 23.4 19.4 33.7 26.2 19.4 18.5 
Source: Barro, Sala-i-Martin (2004, p.15) 
 
In all countries, except for the United States, present saving rates are significantly above their 
levels in late nineteenth century. Similar evidence is seen in East Asia for the last half 
century.  
Table 2. Gross national saving rates in East Asian countries (percent) 
Period Hong Kong Taipei Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines 
1960’s 31  14  8  25   22  7  17 
1970’s 32  27  35  29   26  19  21 
1980’s 34 31  42  33   26  33  20 
1993 37  28  50  41   35  34  14 
Source: Leipziger and Thomas (1997) 
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With the exception of the Philippines, gross national saving rates have increased in the Asian 
newly industrialized countries over the last fifty years, as shown in Table 2. Along the same 
lines, Loayza et al. (2000) show for 98 countries that private saving rates rise with the level of 
real per capita income. 
 
2.2 Hump in the saving rate along transitional paths 
 
That the gross saving rates are lower in the nineteen eighties than earlier is a well documented 
regularity (cf. Shafer et al. 1992). Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1999) as well as Antràs (2001) 
demonstrate that for most of 24 OECD countries, as well as for the OECD as a whole, the 
transitional paths of the saving rates exhibit a statistically significant hump when considering 
the last half century. Maddison (1992) shows that in many countries, after World War II, the 
saving rate exhibits overshooting. Similar trends are reported by Bosworth et al. (1991), 
Christiano (1989), Chari et al. (1996), and Tease et al. (1991). Specifically, Antràs (2001, p.1) 
finds that “there is clear evidence of a hump shape in the series. This is confirmed … where 
the series is detrended, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, to remove business cycle 
fluctuations. Different tests on the series corroborated the statistical significance of the 
hump”. 
 
More recent data from the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts 
data files confirm these findings, as shown in Figure 1. The figure shows gross savings as a 
share of the GDP for OECD member countries (all members, and a subgroup of high-income 
countries) as well as for the world as a whole. The hump of the saving rate is obvious in the 
two diagrams showing the savings rates for OECD countries over time.  
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Figure 1. Gross savings as percentage of GDP (1965 – 2012) 
Source: World Bank indicators: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts 
data files. 
Notes. Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers; 
High-income economies are those in which 2012 GNI per capita was $12,616 or more. 
 
The hump of the saving rate over time is less pronounced in the diagram showing the saving 
rates for the world as a whole. In line with the argument pursued in this paper, many countries 
experience a saving rate hump in course of developing from a low- to a medium-/high income 
country (see Antràs 2001). In the diagram exhibiting world data, the transitional paths of 
countries with a high GDP (and a declining saving rate) are aggregated with those of countries 
with a low GDP (and an increasing saving rate). As a consequence, the saving rate hump for 
the period of the last half century is less pronounced for the world as a whole than for a group 
of similar countries (OECD) or for individual countries. 
 
Remark. (Magnitude of the “saving rate hump”) Considering aggregate data for developed 
countries in the last 50 years, Figure 1 suggests a saving rate hump of around 5 percentage 
points. In the following, we argue that – in contrast with a reasonably calibrated model with 
exponential discounting – our framework with hyperbolic discounting implies a saving rate 
hump of the right magnitude.  
 
3. Hyperbolic discounting 
 
Psychologists and behavioral economists have established the fact that a household’s discount 
rate declines over time (cf., e.g., Ainslie 1992, and Laibson 1997, Thaler 1981). In his seminal 
paper, Thaler (1981) reports that when individuals are given a choice between one apple today 
and two tomorrow, most choose one apple today. However, when individuals are given a 
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choice between one apple in 50 days versus two apples in 51 days, the same group of 
decision-makers choose two apples in violation of the stationarity of the discount rate. As a 
conclusion, the pure rate of time preference is considered to decline in delay (time). 
 
Accordingly, we allow the discount rate (pure rate of time preference), ρτ , to depend on 
delay. In the special case of exponential discounting, ρτ = ρ  is stationary. In the more general 
case of hyperbolic discounting, ρτ  declines in delay, τ . We use the notation  
ρt t0  (or simply 
ρτ ) for an individual’s discount rate of date  t  as seen from date  t0 , that is, for a delay of 
 τ = t − t0  periods. 
 
We define a household’s discount function by  D(t − t0 ) ≡ e
− ρs ds
0
t−t0
∫
, or equivalently, by 
 D(τ ) ≡ e
− ρs ds
0
τ
∫
. For  τ = 0 ,  D(0) = 1 , regardless of whether an individual is an exponential or a 
hyperbolic discounter. The discount rate, then, is the rate at which the discount function 
declines in delay: 
 
ρτ = −
!Dτ
Dτ
. For an exponential discounter,  D(τ ) ≡ e
−ρτ  implying 
 
−
!Dτ
Dτ
= ρ . 
 
3.1 Regular hyperbolic discounting 
 
In the following, we specify a rather general class of discount functions that encompasses 
most special cases employed in the prior literature. Following the concepts employed by 
Groth et al. (2010), we call this class the class of regular discount functions. This class is 
defined by the property that the second-order growth rate of the discount function is 
proportional to the first-order growth rate.  
 
The first-order growth rate of the discount factor is given by  gD =
!Dτ / Dτ = −ρτ < 0 . The 
second-order growth rate of the discount factor is given by 
 
g2,D = !gD / gD = !ρτ / ρτ . Following 
Groth et al. (2010), we call discount functions regular, if  
 
  
g2,D = β gD , β ≥ 0 , (1) 
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where the constant β  is called the hyperbolic discounting coefficient. Given  D0 = 1, the 
second order differential equation (1) has the unique solution 
 
 
Dτ = (1+ ρ0βτ )
−1/β , ρτ =
ρ0
1+ ρ0βτ
. (2) 
The regular discount functions (2) encompass a number of special cases, depending on the 
specific value of the hyperbolic discounting coefficient. First, if  β = 0 ,  ρτ = ρ0 . This is the 
case of conventional exponential discounting. Second, if  β > 0 , the discount rate declines in 
τ . This is the case of hyperbolic discounting. If  β = 1,  Dτ = (1+ ρ0τ )
−1 . This is the case of 
classical hyperbolic discounting.2 As the hyperbolic discounting coefficient rises, the rate of 
decline of the discount rate becomes larger, and as the hyperbolic discounting coefficient 
approaches infinity, the discount rate declines to zero instantly. Table 3 summarizes regular 
discount functions. 
 
Table 3. Regular discount functions 
     β   ρτ     Dτ  
Regular discounting (general)  β ≥ 0     ρ0 / 1+ ρ0βτ( )   (1+ ρ0βτ )−1/β  
Exponential discounting   β = 0    ρ0     e
−ρ0τ  
Classical hyperbolic discounting  β = 1   ρ0 / 1+ ρ0τ( )    1/ 1+ ρ0τ( )  
No-discounting   β →∞  0        1 
 
Figure 2 shows regular time paths of the discount rate for various values of the hyperbolic 
discounting coefficient. The figure illustrates that these paths capture the whole spectrum of 
discount rate paths between exponential discounting, less-than-exponential (that is, 
hyperbolic) discounting, and no discounting at all. 
 
                                                
2 In the original, classical psychological literature, hyperbolic discount functions like  1/ τ  or  (1+ ρ0τ )
−1  were 
used (Ainslie, 1992). 
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Figure 2. Time paths of the discount rate with  ρ0 = 0.03 . 
 
3.2 Hyperbolic- versus exponential discounting: a controlled experiment 
 
In the subsequent sections, we argue that hyperbolic discounting is the key ingredient for 
explaining the magnitude of empirically observed humps of transitional paths of the saving 
rate. With exponential discounting alone, the magnitude of the humps cannot be explained. 
This raises one question. How can a model with exponential discounting be sensibly 
compared with one with hyperbolic discounting? Findley and Caliendo (2014) and Caliendo 
and Findley (2014) argue that psychologists have always used the “overall level of 
impatience” as a key measure. They argue that for a comparison to be sensible (a controlled 
experiment) the overall level of impatience must be the same for exponential and hyperbolic 
consumers. Experiments that do not control for the overall level of impatience may implicate 
spurious results that are entirely due to different overall levels of impatience – not to 
hyperbolic, as opposed to exponential discounting.3  
 
Let  h∈! ++  be the number of periods characterizing an individual’s planning horizon. For 
 t ∈ 0,h⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , the overall level of impatience,  I(h) , is given by the area above the discounting 
curve  D(τ )  and below one (see Figure 3, below). That is, 
                                                
3 As shown below, generally, there is no observational equivalence between exponential- and hyperbolic 
discounting.  
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I(h) ≡ 1− D(τ )dτ
0
h
∫  . (3) 
Consider an exponential and a hyperbolic discount function:  DE (τ ) , and  DH (τ ) . Then, the 
overall level of impatience is the same if and only if  
 
 
1− DE (τ )dτ
0
h
∫ = 1− DH (τ )dτ
0
h
∫ ⇔ DE (τ )dτ
0
h
∫ = DH (τ )dτ
0
h
∫  . (4) 
Considering (2), for any given  ρ0 ≡ ρH 0 , (4) allows for calculating that specific value of the 
exponential discount rate,  ρE , for which the overall level of impatience for the planning 
period  t ∈ 0,h⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  is the same. Figure 3 shows one example for  β = 50, h = 20  and  ρH 0 = 0.06 . 
According to (4), the “controlled” value of the exponential discount rate corresponds to 
 ρE = 0.0064  (see Appendix). 
 
 
Figure 3. Exponential- and hyperbolic discount functions with the same overall level of impatience: 
 β = 50, h = 20, ρH 0 = 0.06, ρE = 0.0064 . 
 
In the following analysis, we distinguish between uncontrolled experiments not satisfying (4) 
and controlled experiments satisfying (4).  
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4. The neoclassical growth model with hyperbolic discounting and short-term planning 
 
We modify the standard neoclassical growth model in that we allow preferences to exhibit 
two non-standard features. First, naïve individuals may discount hyperbolically rather than 
exponentially. They consider their future discount rates to be lower than the present one. 
However, when future arrives, they realize that their discount rate, then, is higher than 
planned. That is, hyperbolic discounting introduces time-inconsistency. Second, individuals 
exhibit a short planning horizon. That is, they are not planning from  t0  to infinity, they rather 
plan from  t0  to some finite period  t0 + h . In accordance with the individuals’ naïveté, they not 
only consider their discount rate to be constant, they also consider the time  t0 - wage and 
interest rates to remain constant during their short planning horizon at their  t0  levels. As 
shown below, due to time-inconsistency, individuals re-optimize and form new plans at every 
instant  t . Following the procedure introduced by Caliendo and Aadland (2007), and Findley 
and Caliendo (2009), we provide an exact analytical solution to this growth model with 
hyperbolic discounting and short-term planning, in which consumers form time-inconsistent 
saving plans. In the subsequent subsection, we consider the impact of hyperbolic discounting 
and short-term planning on the transitional dynamics of the saving rate. 
 
4.1 The model 
 
4.1.1 Households 
 
The economy is populated with a large number,  
Lt , of identical, naïve, infinitely lived 
households. Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor per unit of time. A 
household’s preferences are described by an instantaneous CRRA utility function with 
absolute elasticity of marginal utility of consumption equal to  θ ≥ 0 . At every date  t , a 
household is planning ahead for  h∈! ++  periods (short-term planning) and plans a sequence 
of consumption 
 
ct{ }t0
t0+h  so as to maximize the present value of intertemporal utility 
 
 
 
U (t0;h) =
ct
1−θ −1
1−θt0
t0+h
∫ Lt D(t − t0 )dt, t ∈[t0 ,t0 + h]   (5) 
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subject to the flow budget constraint 
 
 
 
!kt = (rt − n)kt + wt − ct , kt0 > 0given, t ∈[t0 ,t0 + h]   (6) 
 
 – where  k,w,r  respectively denote capital per capita, wage rate and the interest rate – and 
the terminal condition 
 
 
 
kt0+h = 0  . (7) 
 
Two remarks are in order. First, in (5),  Lt = e
nt  represents the population size with  n ≥ 0  
representing the exogenous growth rate of the population. Furthermore, the discount function 
 D(t − t0 )  is considered to be a regular discount function as given by (2). This discount 
function encompasses the special case of exponential discounting as the limit when the 
hyperbolic discounting coefficient β  approaches zero.  
 
Second, at every point  t , a household solves a short-horizon (fixed-endpoint) control 
problem. The solution to this optimal control problem is planned consumption from the 
perspective of  t0 . The (fixed-endpoint) terminal condition  
kt0+h = 0  indicates that the 
household is concerned only with the “next” h periods. It does not imply that wealth (capital) 
is actually equal to zero at  t0 + h , as the household’s planning horizon is continuously sliding 
forward. As the planning horizon is sliding forward, previous consumption plans are 
invalidated, and the household re-optimizes and updates its consumption plan at every t. That 
is, although a household plans to exhaust its resources within h periods, it never actually 
exhausts its resources in finite time, as it keeps re-planning its consumption plans.  
 
At  t = t0 , the Hamiltonian of the control problem becomes: 
 
 
 
H (ct ,kt ,µt ;t0 ) =
ct
1−θ −1
1−θ
ent D(t − t0 )+ µt[(rt − n)kt + wt − ct ] , t ∈ t0 ,t0 + h⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  . (8) 
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As demonstrated in the Appendix, the optimal consumption plan – as seen from date  t0  – is 
given by:  
 
 
 
!c(t | t0 ) =
!kt0 + !wτ e
− Rˆ(τ ,t0 )+γ (τ −t0 )
t0
t0+h∫ dτ
D(τ − t0 )
1/θ
t0
t0+h∫ e
−θ−1
θ
Rˆ(τ ,t0 )−γ t0+n/θτ dτ
eRˆ(t ,t0 )/θ Lt
1/θe−γ t D(t − t0 )
1/θ  , (9) 
 
where 
 
Rˆ(t,t0 ) ≡ (rt0 − n)dt
t0
t
∫ = (rt0 − n)(t − t0 ) , as households consider the rate of interest – as 
seen from  t0  – fixed. A tilde denotes units of effective labor. Let the exogenous rate of 
technical progress be given by γ , then:  !xt ≡ xte
−γ t ,  x ∈ k,w,c{ }  (see also below). Due to 
time-inconsistency, the household follows this consumption plan only at  t = t0 . So, we 
consider the envelope, by setting all  t = t0 . In the resulting expression, we then replace  t0  by 
 t , which directly yields the exact analytical solution to this optimal control problem in which 
naïve consumers form time-inconsistent saving- and consumption plans.  
 
 
 
!ct =
!kt + !wt e
−(rt−γ −n)(τ −t )
t
t+h
∫ dτ
D(τ − t)1/θ
t
t+h
∫ e
− θ−1
θ
rt−n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t )
dτ
  (10) 
 
Equation (10) presents optimal consumption of a short-sighted household with hyperbolic 
discounting. Consumption is derived as the envelope of infinitely many initial values from a 
continuum of planned time paths. The numerator of (10) represents total (physical and 
human) wealth, and the denominator represents the inverse of the propensity to consume out 
of total wealth. Specifically, let  
 
 
 
Δ ≡ D(τ − t)1/θ
t
t+h
∫ e
− θ−1
θ
rt−n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t )
dτ  , (11) 
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then, the propensity to consume out of total wealth is given by  Δ−1 , and equation (10) reads 
 
!ct = Δ
−1 !kt + !wt e
−(rt−γ −n)(τ −t )
t
t+h
∫ dτ⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
. 
 
The important insight from (10) consists in the fact that – as the propensity to consume 
generally depends on calendar time t via  rt  – there exists no observational equivalence 
between exponential- and hyperbolic discounting. By observational equivalence, we mean 
that for every hyperbolic discount function  DH (τ )  there exists an exponential discount 
function  DE (τ )  so that the observed consumption paths are the same under both discount 
functions.  
 
Proposition 1. Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon,  h∈! ++ , and 
 θ ≠ 1, and a time-dependent rate of interest  rt . Then, the model with hyperbolic discounting 
is not observationally equivalent to a corresponding model with exponential discounting. 
 
Proof.  Suppose, contrary to the proposition, observational equivalence holds. Then, for some 
date  t0  it must be true that 
 
 
DH (τ − t0 )
1/θ
t0
t0+h∫ e
− θ−1
θ
rt0 −n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t0 )
dτ = DE (τ − t0 )
1/θ
t0
t0+h∫ e
− θ−1
θ
rt0 −n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t0 )
dτ   (12) 
Note that the discount functions do not depend on calendar time  t0  (by definition, they only 
depend on delay). Also, observe that the weight  e
− θ−1
θ
rt0 −n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t0 )
 changes in calendar time as 
long as the rate of interest is not stationary. Therefore, if (12) holds at some date  t0 , since 
generally  DH (τ − t0 ) ≠ DE (τ − t0 ) , it is not possible that (12) also holds at  t ≠ t0 , a 
contradiction.   || 
 
Proposition 1 contrasts sharply with the commonly accepted argument that a model with 
hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to one with exponential discounting (cf. 
Barro 1999). Based on the important result established by Proposition 1, we will investigate 
the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the “savings hump,” below.  
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Corollary 1. (Observational equivalence) 
Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon,  h∈! ++ , and logarithmic utility 
 θ = 1. Then, the model with hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to a 
corresponding model with exponential discounting. 
 
Corollary 1 can immediately be seen when setting  θ = 1  in (12). With logarithmic utility, for 
every hyperbolic discount function there exists an exponential discount function so that the 
observed consumption paths are the same under both discount functions. Below, we will 
therefore not consider the special case of logarithmic utility. For hyperbolic discounting and 
short-term planning to have an impact on the “savings hump,” we will restrict attention to 
 θ ≠ 1 (generally to  θ >1 , see below). 
 
It is worth noting that observational equivalence does not imply that a controlled experiment 
is pursued. The mere fact that there exists an exponential discount function that gives rise to 
the same observed consumption path as the hyperbolic discount function does not imply that 
the overall level of discounting is the same under both discount functions (cf. (4)). 
 
Corollary 2. (Observational equivalence and a controlled experiment) 
(i) If and only if  θ = 1, observational equivalence meets the requirement of a controlled 
experiment; that is, the overall level of discounting is the same under both discount functions. 
(ii) If the rate of interest is stationary,  rt = r , observational equivalence may occur. But as 
long as  θ ≠ 1, the overall level of discounting between a hyperbolic- and an exponential 
discount function differs. 
 
4.1.2 Production and the market economy 
 
Output,  Y , is produced via the CES technology 
 
 
 
Yt = A αKt
(σ −1)/σ + (1−α )(Tt Lt )
(σ −1)/σ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
σ /(σ −1)
, A > 0, 0 <α <1, σ > 0 , (13) 
 
where  L  is labor input,  K  is capital input, and  T  is an index of labor-augmenting 
productivity that evolves through exogenous disembodied technical change: 
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  Tt = e
γ t , γ ≥ 0 . (14) 
Parameter α  represents the weight of capital in production, and parameter σ  denotes the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.  
 
We consider a closed economy so that national income accounting implies 
  Yt = Ct + It , (15) 
where  Ct  is aggregate consumption. Then, the capital stock develops according to  
  
!Kt = Yt −Ct −δKt , δ > 0 , (16) 
where δ  is the rate of depreciation of capital.  
 
Let a tilde denote variables in units of effective labor  (TL) . Then, production function (13) 
becomes 
 
 
!yt = A α !kt
(σ −1)/σ + (1−α )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
σ /(σ −1)
 , (17) 
and resource constraint (16) reads:  
!"kt = !yt − !ct − (n+ γ +δ ) !kt .  
 
We now embed the described technology into a market economy with perfect competition. 
The representative firm chooses inputs so as to maximize the profit for a given real wage, 
 wt = ∂Yt / ∂Lt , and capital rental rate,  qt = ∂Yt / ∂Kt . That is, the rate of return on holding 
capital is given by  rt = qt −δ . 
 
 
4.2 Behavior of the saving rate 
 
From (10) and (17), the saving rate becomes  
 
   
 
st = 1−
!ct
!yt
= 1− Δ−1 !kt !yt + !wt !yt e
−(rt−γ −n)(τ −t )
t
t+h
∫ dτ⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
,
where rt =α A
(σ −1)/σ !kt
−1/σ !yt
1/σ −δ , !wt =
1−α
α
(rt +δ ) !kt
1/σ , !yt = A α !kt
(σ −1)/σ + (1−α )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
σ /(σ −1)
.
 (18) 
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As an economy develops (when  
!kt  increases over time), whether the saving rate increases or 
decreases (possibly non-monotonically) along the transition path depends on whether  !ct  
increases by more or by less than  !yt . In general, the behavior of the saving rate is 
complicated along the transition path as a substitution effect opposes an income effect. As the 
return on saving declines, ceteris paribus households tend to lower the saving rate over time 
(substitution effect). At the same time, as  
!kt  rises, the difference between current and 
permanent income decreases. The desire for consumption smoothing requires a household in 
an economy distant from the steady state to consume more relative to actual income than a 
household in an economy close to the steady state. As the economy develops, then, 
consumption relative to income declines. This income effect tends to raise the saving rate over 
time.  
 
For the special case of Cobb-Douglas production, it has been demonstrated by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004, p.135 ff) that the dynamics of the saving rate is always monotonic – a 
counterfactual prediction, as shown in Section 2. For the more general case of CES 
production, however, Smetters (2003) and Gómez (2008) demonstrate that for important cases 
the transitional path of the saving rate exhibits a hump.4 Specifically, they analyze the 
dynamics of  zt ≡ !ct / !yt  in a framework with an infinite planning horizon, perfect foresight, 
and exponential discounting. In such a framework, if  σ <1 , the  !z(r, z) = 0  locus typically 
exhibits a U-shaped pattern in  (r, z)  space. Let the minimum of the  !z(r, z) = 0  locus occur at 
 (r0 , z0 ) . If parameters are such that  z0 > 0  and  r
* < r0  (with  r
*  representing the steady state 
rate of interest), then the saddle path is U-shaped in  (r, z)  space. That is, as  
!kt  increases over 
time,  st = 1− zt  increases first and decreases later on. The transitional path of  st  exhibits a 
saving rate hump (Gómez 2008, pp. 203f). 
 
Numerical simulations employing the framework with CES production and exponential 
discounting, however, show that for reasonable parameterizations the saving rate humps have 
very small amplitudes. These amplitudes are not consistent with the much larger amplitudes 
shown by empirical evidence (Section 2). 
                                                
4 We refer to the hump in the transitional path of the saving rate as the saving rate hump. 
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The consideration of hyperbolic discounting in the framework with short-term planning and 
CES production adds a third effect that we term hyperbolic discounting effect. This additional 
effect tends to heighten the saving hump. As shown in the following section, the hyperbolic 
discounting effect allows for amplitudes of the saving rate hump that are consistent with the 
empirical evidence. 
 
In the following, we compare the propensities to consume between a hyperbolic- and an 
exponential discounter. The hyperbolic discounting effect is caused by the fact that the change 
in the propensity to consume over time differs between exponential and hyperbolic discount 
functions, irrespective of whether (4) is satisfied or not.5 Specifically, consider the integrals of 
the exponentiated discount functions: 
 
 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ =
θ −1+ 1+ hβρ0( )1−
1
βθ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−1+ βθ( )ρ0
, DE (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ =
θ 1− e
−
hρE
θ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ρE
 . (19) 
 
Assumption 1.    β ≥1, θ >1          (A.1) 
 
Assumption 1 mildly restricts regular discount functions to those consistent with classical 
hyperbolic discounting or those for which the discount rate declines more strongly as 
compared to classical hyperbolic discounting. The restriction on the elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of less than unity.6 
Under (A.1) – for a given wealth (in (18), the term in square brackets) – the income effect 
exceeds the substitution effect. That is, holding the wealth constant, as  
!kt  increases, the 
saving rate rises. However, as  
!kt  increases, so does wealth, as seen by the term in square 
                                                
5 Considering (18), the hyperbolic discounting effect is not related to the wealth to income ratio. 
6 That  θ > 1  is overwhelmingly suggested by the literature. Hall (1988, p. 350) favors a value of (at least) 
θ = 5 . 
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brackets in (18).7 This wealth effect raises the consumption share in income and thereby 
lowers the saving rate. 
 
The following three lemmas are useful for characterizing the hyperbolic discounting effect 
(see Proposition 2). 
 
Lemma 1.   Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, 
 
 
limβ→0 DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ = DE (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ . 
Proof.   Consider (19). Taking the limit of 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ  as β  approaches zero directly yields 
the result.   || 
 
The lemma confirms that the known limit result  
limβ→0 DH (τ ) = DE (τ )  extends to the integral 
of the exponentiated discount functions. Exponential discounting, in the version presented in 
Lemma 1, remains the special case of hyperbolic discounting in which  β = 0 . 
 
Lemma 2.   The integral 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ  rises in beta.  
Proof.   See Appendix.   || 
 
Lemma 2 states that the overall level of impatience – that is, 
 
1− DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ  – is the lower 
the higher is the rate of decline of the hyperbolic discount rate (the higher is β ). 
 
Lemma 3.   Let the weight  E(rt ,τ ) ≡ e
− θ−1
θ
rt−n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t )
. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and  τ > t . 
Then: 
(i) 
 
∂E(rt ,τ )
∂ !kt
=
∂E(rt ,τ )
∂rt
∂rt
∂ !kt
> 0 ; 
(ii) 
 
lim !kt→∞ E(rt ,τ ) ≥1; 
                                                
7 It can easily be veryfied from (18) that, given the CES production technology, both  
!k
t
!y
t
 and  !wt !yt  are 
increasing functions of  
!k
t
.  
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(iii) 
 
lim !kt→0 E(rt ,τ ) =
0 for σ ≥1
<1 for σ <1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
. 
Proof.   (i) Follows from the assumption that  θ >1 .   (ii)  
lim !kt→∞ !y '(
!k ) = 0 . If  n+δ = 0 , 
 
lim !kt→∞ E(rt ,τ ) = 1. If  n+δ > 0 ,  
lim !kt→∞ E(rt ,τ ) >1.   (iii) If  σ ≥1 ,  
lim !kt→0 rt = ∞ . If  σ <1 , 
0<
 
lim !kt→0 rt < ∞ . The result directly follows.   || 
 
Lemma 3 shows that as an economy develops (as  
!kt  increases) the weight  E(rt ,τ )  strictly 
monotonically increases. For a very high rate of interest  E(rt ,τ ) ≈ 0 , and for a very low rate 
of interest  E(rt ,τ ) ≈1 . 
 
Proposition 2. (Hyperbolic discounting effect)   Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then 
 
 
ΔH ≡ DH (τ − t)
1/θ
t
t+h
∫ e
− θ−1
θ
rt−n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t )
dτ ≥ DE (τ − t)
1/θ
t
t+h
∫ e
− θ−1
θ
rt−n
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
(τ −t )
dτ ≡ ΔE . 
Specifically, if  E(rt ,τ ) > 0 , the inequality is strict:  ΔH > ΔE . Moreover, as an economy 
develops (as  
!kt  increases over time), the strictly positive difference  ΔH − ΔE > 0  becomes 
larger. 
 
Proof.   See Appendix.   || 
 
Proposition 2 defines the hyperbolic discounting effect as the increasing difference over time 
in the change of the propensity to consume between exponential and hyperbolic discount 
functions. As shown in the proof of the proposition, the difference is due to the fact that 
compensation rule (4) for the exponential discount rate  ρE (β )  refers to the integrals 
 
D(τ − t)
t
t+h
∫ dτ , not to the exponentiated integrals  D(τ − t)
1/θ
t
t+h
∫ dτ . That is,  ρE (β )  
equalizes 
 
DH (τ − t)t
t+h
∫ dτ  and  DE (τ − t)t
t+h
∫ dτ , but not the integrals of the exponentiated 
discount functions. Let  ρE |θ>1  be the exponential discount rate that equalizes the integrals of 
the exponentiated discount functions. Generally  ρE |θ=1≠ ρE |θ>1 . As shown in the proof, 
 ρE |θ=1> ρE |θ>1 . As the propensities to consume depend on the exponentiated discount 
22 
 
functions, generally  ΔH ≠ ΔE . With  θ >1 , the adjusted – according to (4) – exponential 
discount rate is larger than the one required to equalize the integrals of the exponentiated 
discount functions. Therefore,  ΔH > ΔE . 
 
The increase in the difference  (ΔH − ΔE ) > 0  over time is due to the weight  E(rt ,τ ) . With 
 θ >1 , the income effect dominates the substitution effect, and as  rt  declines over time 
 E(rt ,τ )  rises over time (thereby lowering the propensity to consume). The rise in  E(rt ,τ )  
increases the difference  ΔH − ΔE  over time.  
 
The propensity to consume is given by  Δ−1 . As  
!kt  increases over time, the hyperbolic 
discounting effect lowers the propensity to consume in a hyperbolic discounting framework 
relative to an exponential discounting framework. That is, as  
!kt  increases over time, the 
hyperbolic discounting effect tends to raise the saving rate relative to a framework with 
exponential discounting, and thereby tends to heighten the saving hump. 
 
Intuitively, a declining discount rate over time affects the intertemporal substitution effect. At 
any per capita income level, future consumption becomes more attractive as it is less strongly 
discounted relative to exponential discounting. This hyperbolic discounting effect encourages 
a higher saving rate, and hence investment in capital accumulation. At the same time, the 
induced higher saving rate and resulting faster capital accumulation yields higher per capita 
income level at any future date (again relative to that under the exponential case), which in 
turn raises the above-mentioned wealth effect, tending to lower the saving rate, according to 
(18).  
 
The critical consideration in explaining possible dynamics of the saving rate over time is to 
know how these opposing effects of a declining discount rate themselves change over time as, 
on the one hand, the discount rate decreases with time and the per capita income rises on the 
other hand. Obviously, the extent of the hump and its timing depend critically on the 
particular hyperbolic discount function assumed (the value of the hyperbolic discounting 
coefficient β ), on the utility function assumed (value of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution), and on the production function used (implying how fast output per head grows 
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as capital is accumulated). Thus, for example, depending on the assumed values of 
parameters, it may be the case that the hump in the savings rate occurs relatively soon but is 
not very pronounced, or alternatively it may occur after a longer period of time with a higher 
hump, or various other possible combinations of these, each reflecting the experience of 
different countries as they have developed. It may also be the case that for a set of parameter 
values, the hump does not occur, implying that either the intertemporal substitution or wealth 
effect dominates for a very long time period.  
 
Taking the hyperbolic discounting effect into account, in addition to the substitution and 
income (wealth) effects, may give rise to a humped transitional path of the saving rate – even 
with Cobb-Douglas production technology. The numerical simulations presented in the next 
section address the question of the quantitative impact of hyperbolic discounting on the saving 
rate hump.   
 
5. Results from numerical simulations 
 
Proposition 2 implies the qualitative result that the hyperbolic discounting effect tends to 
heighten the saving rate hump. Considering reasonable calibrations, three main quantitative 
questions suggest themselves. First, by how much does the introduction of hyperbolic 
discounting (a rise in β ) heighten the saving rate hump? Second, how does the length of the 
planning horizon affect the saving rate hump? Third, how different is the saving rate hump 
between exponential and hyperbolic discounting in a controlled experiment? The numerical 
simulations that follow address these questions. 
 
To that end, we consider an adverse shock on the predetermined state variable  !k . At time 
zero, starting from an initial steady state, we reduce the value of the predetermined variable. 
The resulting time paths show the non-linearized transitions of the saving rate (and other 
variables of interest) from far away from the steady state to the steady state equilibrium. 
These transition paths are interpreted as showing the development of the saving rate (and 
other variables) as a country develops, i.e., as its stock of capital  !k  increases.8   
                                                
8 We employ the Mathematica implementation of the Relaxation Algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008) to produce 
the numerical results documented in this paper. The code is available from the authors upon request. Notice that 
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Table 4. Baseline values of background parameters 
Preference parameters  ρ0 = 0.06 ,    θ = 5   
Production parameters  A = 2 ,    α = 0.7 ,    γ = 0.02 ,    δ = 0.06 ,    σ = 0.8   
Population growth rate  n = 0.01  
Note. The hyperbolic discounting coefficient, β , as well as the planning horizon  h  vary 
across simulations. 
 
What we call baseline values of the background parameters are listed in Table 4. The graphs 
below are based on these parameter values, which may be considered standard and 
noncontroversial. Notice that  ρ0  represents the hyperbolic discount rate at  τ = 0 . The value 
for the elasticity of marginal utility is in line with the estimate of Hall (1988, p.350). 
 
The parameters of primary interest are β  and  h . The empirical literature does not provide 
firm conclusions as to possible magnitudes of these parameters. To clarify the potential 
quantitative roles of β  and  h  for the saving rate hump, we consider different values of these 
parameters in the numerical simulations.  
 
For  β = 50  and  h = 50 , together with the baseline values of the background parameters, 
important stylized facts for a modern industrialized economy are reproduced by the model. 
Per capita consumption grows at a rate of 2% per year, around 25% of output is devoted to 
investment, and the output-capital ratio is 0.37 in steady state. 
 
Figure 3, presents transition paths of the saving rates for the baseline values of background 
parameters and for various values of β . The calculations of the transition paths are based on 
the Relaxation Algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008). 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
the shock is introduced on the state variable, not on a specific parameter. All parameters take on the same values 
before and after the shock.  
25 
 
 
Figure 4. The saving rate hump as the hyperbolic discounting coefficient β  rises.   
Notes.  h = 50 . 
 
Result 1. The amplitude of the saving rate hump significantly increases in the hyperbolic 
discounting coefficient β . A value of  β = 50  implies an amplitude of the saving hump that 
accords with empirical evidence. 
 
The figure shows the saving rate hump for various values of the hyperbolic discounting 
coefficient. The amplitude of the saving rate hump increases in β . This effect of hyperbolic 
discounting was already identified, qualitatively, in Proposition 2. Quantitatively, the figure 
suggests a very small amplitude of the saving rate hump for small values of the hyperbolic 
discounting coefficient. For example,  β = 2  ( β < 2 ) implies an amplitude of roughly one 
(less than one) percentage point. Higher values of β  imply a much larger amplitude.  β = 50  
( β > 50 ) implies an amplitude of about four (more than four) percentage points.
9 The latter 
amplitudes correspond well with empirical evidence. 
 
                                                
9 A lower initial value of the hyperbolic discount rate further accentuates the saving rate hump. 
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Figure 5. The saving rate hump as the planning horizon parameter  h  rises.   
Notes.  β = 50 . 
 
It is worth emphasizing that even if β  is close to zero, the model does imply a saving rate 
hump. The existence of such a hump under a CES production technology was already 
demonstrated by Smetters (2003) and Gómez (2008). However, as indicated by Figure 4, the 
implied saving rate hump is significantly smaller as compared with empirical evidence. 
 
The second quantitative question refers to the sensitivity of the above result with respect to 
the length of the planning horizon,  h .  
 
Result 2. The planning horizon parameter  h  strongly affects both the amplitude of the saving 
rate hump as well as the steady state level of the saving rate. A rise in  h  raises the steady 
state saving rate. 
 
Figure 5 shows the saving rate hump for various values of the short-term planning horizon 
parameter  h . For given β , a rise in  h  raises 
 
 
DH (τ − t)
1/θ
t
t+h
∫ dτ =
θ −1+ (1+ βhρ0 )
(βθ−1)/βθ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
(βθ −1)ρ0
 , 
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thereby increasing  ΔH  and lowering the propensity to consume  ΔH
−1 . According to (18), the 
lower propensity to consume raises the saving rate both along the (hump-shaped) transitional 
path and in steady state. 
 
The figure suggests that for  β = 50  together with the baseline values of the background 
parameters, a value of the short-term planning horizon parameter of  h = 50  implies a saving 
rate hump that is consistent with empirical evidence. Too low a value of  h  results in a steady 
state saving rate too low as to be empirically supported (cf.  h = 5  in Figure 5). Too high a 
value of  h  results in a very large steady state saving rate. As a consequence, the amplitude of 
the saving rate – viewed as difference between the peak of the saving rate hump and the 
steady state level of the saving rate – becomes lower as suggested by empirical evidence. 
 
The final quantitative question refers to the difference between hyperbolic- and exponential 
discounting in a controlled experiment, that is when the exponential discount rate is adjusted 
such that the overall level of impatience is the same under both discount functions. The 
numerical simulations are based on the baseline values of the background parameters. For a 
fixed initial value of the hyperbolic discount rate,  ρ0 , and a given β , the corresponding 
adjusted exponential discount rate is calculated. The following table shows the parameter 
specifications for  β ,ρ0 ,ρE  employed in the simulations. 
 
Table 5. Adjusted exponential discount rates  ρE   
  β = 2    β = 20    β = 50   
       ρ0 = 0.06  0.0270 0.0065 0.0033 
       ρ0 = 0.20   0.0516 0.0089 0.0043 
Note. The overall level of impatience is the same under both discount functions;  h = 50 . 
 
Table 5 shows that for reasonable values of the hyperbolic discounting coefficient β , the 
adjusted exponential discount rate becomes very small, independently of whether the initial 
hyperbolic discount rate is relatively “small” ( ρ0 = 0.06 ) or “large” ( ρ0 = 0.2 ). Specifically, 
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for our preferred value of  β = 50 , the adjusted exponential discount rate is close to zero 
(below  0.005 ) for both initial hyperbolic discount rates. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The saving rate hump under exponential- and hyperbolic discounting. 
Notes. The exponential discount rate is adjusted such that the overall level of impatience is the same 
under both discount functions. 
 
Figure 6 suggests two important insights. First, the saving rate paths under hyperbolic and 
adjusted exponential discounting are similar in all cases. In fact, under  θ = 1, the paths would 
coincide, according to Corollary 2(i). However, with  θ ≠ 1, observational equivalence is ruled 
out by Proposition 1. That is, the difference between the saving rate paths implied by adjusted 
exponential versus hyperbolic discounting is entirely due to the fact that  θ >1  in the 
simulations. 
 
Second, as seen for  β = 50 , adjusted exponential discounting implies a saving rate hump of 
the same magnitude as hyperbolic discounting. That is, not only hyperbolic discounting tends 
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to raise the amplitude of the saving rate but so does also an exceedingly low exponential 
discount rate. The latter effect is due to the fact that a low(ering of the) discount rate weakens 
the substitution effect by which the saving rate tends to decline as  
!kt  increases (as the rate of 
interest declines). However, as shown in Table 5, the adjusted exponential discount rate 
required to produce a saving rate hump of the right magnitude (with  β = 50 ) must be 
extremely small. For  ρ0 = 0.06 , the adjusted exponential discount rate equals  ρE = 0.003 , 
which corresponds to only about one tenth of what is considered a standard estimate of the 
exponential discount rate (in a standard Ramsey model).  
 
As a consequence, for the baseline values of the background parameters, a saving rate hump 
of the right magnitude is implied by two frameworks: (i) a model with hyperbolic discounting 
with  ρ0 = 0.06  and  β = 50 ; (ii) a model with exponential discounting with  ρE = 0.003 . It 
must be emphasized though, that in the model with exponential discounting, a constant 
discount rate of  ρE = 0.003  is not considered a sensible estimate. 
 
All of these results hold irrespective of whether  ρ0  is “small” or “large”. We summarize these 
results in 
 
Result 3. (Controlled experiments) If the exponential discount rate is adjusted so that the 
overall level of impatience is the same under both discount functions: 
(i) the implied transitional paths of the saving rate is similar in both models (exponential and 
hyperbolic discounting); 
(ii) the value of the adjusted exponential discount rate that is needed to imply a saving rate 
hump of the right magnitude is only about one tenth of what is considered a standard estimate 
of the exponential discount rate. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Our paper considers the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the humped transitional 
dynamics of the saving rate. The standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas 
technology exhibits – for a reasonable calibration – a monotonously declining transition path 
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of the saving rate, as per capita incomes increase. This property is counterfactual and 
therefore unappealing for the analysis of policy shocks on transitional dynamics of an 
economy. In response, the prior literature shows that the saving rate exhibits a humped 
transitional dynamics in a neoclassical growth model with CES production technology. For a 
reasonable calibration, however, the amplitude of the hump implied by a framework with 
exponential discounting – roughly one percentage point – falls significantly short of an 
amplitude of roughly five percentage points, as suggested by empirical evidence. In our paper, 
we show that the introduction of hyperbolic discounting (as opposed to exponential 
discounting) amplifies the magnitude of the implied hump in the saving rate dynamics. 
Specifically, according to the numerical simulations, our framework with hyperbolic 
discounting implies an amplitude of the saving rate hump well fitting the empirical evidence.  
 
The main mechanism at work is a hyperbolic discounting effect that is not present in a 
framework with exponential discounting. The hyperbolic discounting effect works via the 
propensity to consume out of wealth. If the elasticity of marginal utility, θ , differs from 
unity, the propensity to consume is not constant over time. Specifically, if  θ >1 , the 
propensity to consume decreases, over time, by more in a framework with hyperbolic 
discounting than in the same framework with exponential discounting. Other things equal, this 
hyperbolic discounting effect tends to raise the saving rate over time. Eventually, the 
hyperbolic discounting effect is dominated by the intertemporal substitution effect that tends 
to lower the saving rate (as the rate of interest declines) over time.  
 
For the analysis of the effects of hyperbolic discounting we introduce the concept of a regular 
discount function. The class of regular discount functions captures all cases in which the 
second order growth rate of the discount rate is a constant multiple of the first-order growth 
rate. Most discounting specifications employed in the prior literature are special cases of the 
class of regular discount functions.  
 
Several questions are open for future research. First, considering the general class of regular 
discount functions, empirical estimates of the key parameter, β , are scarcely available, if any. 
A robust estimate of β  would greatly help to apply a framework with hyperbolic discounting 
to economic analyses of all kinds. Second, in the present paper, the saving rate was defined to 
be the difference between income and consumption relative to income. In a more 
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sophisticated framework, at least one addition is warranted: a public sector. Clearly, a public 
sector interacts with a household’s saving rate. Specifically, the introduction of social security 
systems over the last 50 years, in many countries, probably has affected the development of 
saving rates. Notwithstanding these open questions, we still hope to have shed some light on 
the impact of hyperbolic discounting on saving rate dynamics in a neoclassical growth model. 
 
7. Appendix 
 
A.1 Exponential discount rate in a “controlled” experiment 
 
Considering (2) and (4), for any given hyperbolic discount rate at  τ = 0 ,  ρ0 , the exponential 
discount rate satisfying (4) is given by 
 
 
 
ρE (β ) =
ρ0 β −1( ) 1+ hβρ0( )
1
β
−1
1− 1+ hβρ0( )
1
β
−1
+ 1
h
ProductLog
e
hρ0 β−1( )
1− 1+hβρ0( )1−
1
β hρ0 β −1( )
1− 1+ hβρ0( )1−
1
β
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
. (20) 
As  β → 0 , it follows that  ρE → ρ0 . 
 
A.2 The optimal (time-inconsistent) consumption plan as seen from  t0  
 
At  t = t0 , the Hamiltonian of the control problem becomes: 
 
 
H (ct ,kt ,µt ;t0 ) =
ct
1−θ −1
1−θ
ent D(t − t0 )+ µt[(rt − n)kt + wt − ct ] , t ∈ t0 ,t0 + h⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  . 
The Maximum principle implies:  ct = µt
−1/θ Lt
1/θ D(t − t0 )
1/θ . As  !µt / µt = −(rt − n),   
 
 
ct = µt0
−1/θeRˆ(t ,t0 )/θ Lt
1/θ D(t − t0 )
1/θ  , (21) 
with 
 
Rˆ(t,t0 ) ≡ (rt0 − n)dt
t0
t
∫ = (rt0 − n)(t − t0 ) , as households consider the rate of interest – as 
seen from  t0  – fixed. Considering (21) in the flow budget constraint (6) yields 
 
 
!kt − (rt − n)kt = wt − µt0
−1/θeRˆ(t ,t0 )/θ Lt
1/θ D(t − t0 )
1/θ , 
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the solution of which reads: 
 
 
kt = kt0e
Rˆ(t ,t0 ) + wτ − µt0
−1/θeRˆ(τ ,t0 )/θ Lτ
1/θ D(τ − t0 )
1/θ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦t0
t
∫ e− Rˆ(τ ,t )dτ  . (22) 
Next, we transform variables into units of effective labor, denoted by a tilde. Let the 
exogenous rate of technical progress be given by γ , then:  !xt ≡ xte
−γ t ,  x ∈ k,w,c{ } .  Then, 
(22) becomes: 
 
 
!kt = !kt0e
Rˆ(t ,t0 )−γ (t−t0 ) + !wτ − µt0
−1/θeRˆ(τ ,t0 )/θ Lτ
1/θe−γτ D(τ − t0 )
1/θ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦t0
t
∫ e− Rˆ(τ ,t )+γ (τ −t )dτ  . (23) 
Considering (23) together with the terminal condition 
 
kt0+h = 0 , and solving for the costate 
variable yields: 
 
 
µt0
−1/θ =
!kt0 + !wτ e
− Rˆ(τ ,t0 )+γ (τ −t0 )
t0
t0+h∫ dτ
D(τ − t0 )
1/θ
t0
t0+h∫ e
−θ−1
θ
Rˆ(τ ,t0 )−γ t0+n/θτ dτ
 . (24) 
Considering (24) in (21) yields an expression for planned consumption as seen from  t0 : 
 
 
!c(t | t0 ) =
!kt0 + !wτ e
− Rˆ(τ ,t0 )+γ (τ −t0 )
t0
t0+h∫ dτ
D(τ − t0 )
1/θ
t0
t0+h∫ e
−θ−1
θ
Rˆ(τ ,t0 )−γ t0+n/θτ dτ
eRˆ(t ,t0 )/θ Lt
1/θ D(t − t0 )
1/θ  . || 
 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2 
 
Let  h∈! ++ . The exponentiated discount function  DH (τ )
1/θ :[0,h]→ [0,1]  is strictly 
monotonically decreasing.  DH (0) = 1, and as long as  β ,θ < ∞ ,  DH (h)
1/θ > 0 . Consider 
 β1 > β0 . For every  τ > 0 , a rise in β  from  β0  to  β1  lowers the hyperbolic discount rate ρτ . 
As a consequence, graphically speaking, the discount curve  DH (τ ;β1)
1/θ  is located weakly 
above  DH (τ ;β0 )
1/θ , and it is located strictly above  DH (τ ;β0 )
1/θ  for all  τ > 0 . The area below 
the curves, then, must be larger under  DH (τ ;β1)
1/θ  than under  DH (τ ;β0 )
1/θ , that is, 
 
 
DH (τ ;β1)
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ > DH (τ ;β0 )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ .   || 
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2 
 
(i) Suppose  E(rt ,τ ) = 0 . Then, the weak inequality in Proposition 2 becomes 
 
 
DH (τ − t)
1/θ E(rt ,τ )t
t+h
∫ dτ = DE (τ − t)1/θt
t+h
∫ E(rt ,τ )dτ
= DH (τ − t)
1/θ − DE (τ − t)
1/θ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦t
t+h
∫ E(rt ,τ )dτ = 0.
  
 
(ii) Suppose  E(rt ,τ ) > 0 . We want to show that  ΔH > ΔE . 
 
 
ΔH > ΔE ⇔ DH (τ − t)
1/θ − DE (τ − t)
1/θ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦t
t+h
∫ E(rt ,τ )dτ > 0.   (25) 
A sufficient condition for the strict inequality to hold is: 
 
 
DH (τ − t)
1/θ − DE (τ − t)
1/θ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦t
t+h
∫ dτ > 0 ⇔ DH (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ > DE (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ .  (26) 
The right hand side of the equivalence follows from the fact that the discount functions are 
independent of calendar time. Two cases have to be distinguished.  
Case (ii.a)  ρE = ρ0 , where  ρ0  denotes the hyperbolic discount rate at  τ = 0 . In this case, the 
exponential discount rate is not adjusted so that the overall level of impatience is the same for 
exponential and hyperbolic discounters. By Lemma 1, 
 
limβ→0 DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ = DE (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ . 
By Lemma 2, 
 
∂
∂β
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
> 0 . Hyperbolic discounting occurs when  β > 0 . 
Consequently, 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ > DE (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ , and the sufficient condition (26) holds. 
Case (ii.b)  ρE (β )  is adjusted so that the overall level of impatience is the same for 
exponential and hyperbolic discounters, and (4) is satisfied. Notice that 
 
DE (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫  
necessarily declines in  ρE . The higher the discount rate the lower the discount factor  DE  for 
all  τ > 0 , and the lower the area under the curve  DE (τ ) . A sufficient condition for (26) to 
hold is: 
  ρE (β ) |θ>1< ρE (β ) |θ=1 . (27) 
Adjustment rule (4) requires the exponential discount rate to be adjusted according to 
 ρE (β ) |θ=1 . Let  ρE (β ) |θ>1  be the exponential discount rate for which 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ = DE (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ . Under condition (27), if instead the larger  ρE (β ) |θ=1  is applied 
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– as required by adjustment rule (4) – it follows that 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ > DE (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ . In order 
to validate (27), we calculate 
 
 
ρE |θ>1=
ρ0 βθ −1( ) 1+ hβρ0( )
1
βθ
−1
1− 1+ hβρ0( )
1
βθ
−1
+ θ
h
ProductLog
e
hρ0 βθ−1( )
θ 1− 1+hβρ0( )1−
1
βθ
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
hρ0 βθ −1( )
θ 1− 1+ hβρ0( )1−
1
βθ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 . (28) 
Consider  ρE |θ>1  as a function of θ ,  ρE |θ>1 (θ ) . Then, the following two properties are easily 
verified: (a)  limθ→1ρE |θ>1 (θ ) = ρE |θ=1 ; (b)  
∂
∂θ
ρE |θ>1 (θ ) < 0 . Thus, inequality (27) holds. As a 
consequence, considering (26) and (25),  ΔH > ΔE . 
 
(iii) Steps (i) and (ii) establish that 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ
0
h
∫ dτ > DE (τ )1/θ0
h
∫ dτ . That is, for  E(rt ,τ ) > 0 , 
(25) holds:  ΔH > ΔE . As  
!kt  increases (as  rt  decreases) the weight  E(rt ,τ )  increases, 
according to Lemma 3. That is, the positive difference 
 
DH (τ )
1/θ − DE (τ )
1/θ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦0
h
∫ dτ  is 
multiplied with an increasing strict positive weight  E(rt ,τ )  as  
!kt  increases. Consequently, as 
 
!kt  rises, the strictly positive difference  (ΔH − ΔE )  increases.   || 
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